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1 Introduction
The article argues that sometimes devolution of
power can lead to the enforcement of
majoritarian democracy which is exclusionary
towards minorities, undermines social cohesion
and increases sectarian violence against
minorities, rather than create space for voice and
accountability. In other words, what may seem on
the surface as democratic decentralisation may
under certain conditions be a devolution of power
to local leaders who contribute to the persecution
of minorities, even if they are supported by a
great proportion of the local residents. Social
cohesion is chosen as an analytical category
because it allows for an examination of changing
social relations in terms of times of extraordinary
political change as in the case of Egypt, 2011–12.
The examination of sectarianism against the
backdrop of processes of devolution of political
power provides empirical data to test the assumed
positive relationship between decentralisation
and social cohesion highlighted in much of the
scholarly literature reviewed in Section 2.
The second section of the article discusses the
concepts of social cohesion, decentralisation and
power as they apply to this context – Egypt’s
transition – and provides analysis as to the
causes and manifestations of increased
sectarianism as they have featured in the period
2011–12. A case study of conflict mediation
through informal justice mechanisms is taken to
show the conundrums of informal devolution of
power to local leaders who are not accountable to
anyone, in the absence of the effective
implementation of rule of law. Informal justice
mediation is chosen on several accounts for the
following reasons.
First, theoretically, the administration of justice
through informal local mediation as opposed to
the formal recourse to justice has been one of the
key dimensions associated positively with
political decentralisation processes. Hence the
empirical data provided by the Egypt case study
was useful in exploring the relationship between
informal justice mediation (as one of the proxies
of decentralisation) and sectarian relations (as
an aspect of social cohesion). Second, in view of
the emerging pattern of informal justice
committees being led and mediated by popular
Islamist leaders after sectarian acts of violence,
this seemed to be an important dimension of the
new configuration of power. Third, in these
incidents there were clear processes of
devolution of power from the centre to the local
religious leaders, which allowed for a consistent
documentation of the actors, agendas and
outcomes. Fourth, these processes of informal
justice mediation became widely publicised in
Devolving the Power to Divide:
Sectarian Relations in Egypt (2011–12)
Mariz Tadros
Abstract This article is about decentralisation and social cohesion in religiously heterogeneous communities in
times of political transition. Post-Mubarak Egypt is taken as a case study involving the informal devolution of
power in managing sectarian relations between the majority Muslim and minority Christian populations
between February 2011 and June 2012. On the surface, the process had features of a political decentralisation
of power which holds promise of downward accountability. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF) delegated the governance of local sectarian conflict to religious community leaders enjoying high
popularity, a policy that was subsequently followed by the Muslim Brotherhood-led government. However,
the process of local leaders assuming the power to govern was also an unintended consequence of the
collapse of rule of law in a context of extreme political volatility associated with a country in revolt.
IDS Bulletin Volume 45  Number 5  September 2014   © 2014 The Author. IDS Bulletin © 2014 Institute of Development Studies
Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
69
2 Tadros IDSB45.5.qxd  11/08/2014  16:54  Page 69
Egypt, allowing for a useful examination of the
interface between the local and the national, and
how they affect each other.
2 Decentralisation, social cohesion and power
There is a burgeoning literature suggesting that
one of the measures that can promote social
cohesion and deal with religious and ethnic
conflict is decentralisation. Brief definitions of
the concepts as they are deployed here are
needed. Social cohesion is a ‘fuzzword’ that can
have multiple meanings. Norton and De Haan
(2012: 4) define social cohesion as ‘the capacity
of societies and social groups to peacefully and
inclusively navigate social change, while
enhancing individual and group rights and
freedoms.’ They argue that in practical policy
terms, this requires (1) accounting for low levels
of social exclusion, (2) empowerment of minority
and disadvantaged groups, (3) promoting low
levels of violence, and (4) strengthening
institutions for peaceful management of rapid
change. This approach benefits from the social
dynamics approach developed by Marc et al.
(2013), but is more comprehensive because it
(1) creates a greater balance between a societal
approach and a statist approach, (2) makes the
notion of inclusive policies and rights more
explicit and central and (3) recognises the need
for dealing with inequalities as well as forging
collective identities.
Norton and De Haan (2012: 4) warned that for
the concept of social cohesion to be useful for the
purposes of designing policy to support
progressive developmental change, it needs to
avoid ‘a bias to the established social and political order
and a bias to cultural and social homogeneity’ (italics in
original). If power hierarchies between groups are
ignored, then the bid for creating solidarity can
mean a re-enforcement of existing hegemonic
normative frameworks based on the beliefs and
ideas of the majority. The focus on creating social
harmony and solidarity in the concept of social
cohesion may lead, in more extreme cases, to an
emphasis on participation of people, irrespective
of whether they are participating out of a sense of
inclusion or whether their participation is forced
or for performance purposes. For example, Chan,
To and Chan (2006: 284) argue that ‘social
cohesion requires only people’s participation,
cooperation and mutual help; as such it does not
presuppose values like tolerance or respect for
diversity, or vice versa.’ This kind of
understanding of social cohesion when using
proxies such as participation without looking at
power relations says nothing about the quality of
social relations existing between those co-
operating and therefore says nothing about
whether a society is cohesive or not.
Decentralisation here refers to the transfer of
political and/or economic decision-making
powers from central to local government.
Tranchant suggested that the devolution of
power from the centre to the groups that have
been marginalised reduces their vulnerability to
discrimination and increases their sense of
control over their own affairs: ‘In the field of
ethnic conflict, it is supposed to dampen strife by
giving groups control over their own affairs and
by insulating minorities from predatory politics
from the centre’ (Tranchant 2007: 13). The
implicit assumption here of course is that the
conflict is occurring between groups that occupy
different parts of the country; hence the
devolution of power would go to those groups in
the periphery. Tranchant did not address the
problem that such devolution of power may
re-enforce unequal power hierarchies between
the majority and minority on a local level.
Kaplan (2009: 471) contended that one of the
advantages of decentralisation in relation to
social cohesion is that it grants the ruling powers
legitimacy in the eyes of the people:
a shift from state-centric to more local level
governance would enhance the legitimacy of
the political order… Whereas a robust state
uses local identities, local capacities, and local
institutions to promote its development, a
fragile state’s formal governing structures
undermine all of these indigenous assets. As a
consequence, a weak state cannot leverage its
people’s histories and customs to construct
effective formal institutions with wide
legitimacy; nor can it draw on the social
capital embedded in cohesive groups to
facilitate economic, political, and social
intercourse; and nor is it able to employ the
traditional governing capacities of its citizens
to run the affairs of state.
Following the same line of argument, Marc et al.
(2013: 189) pointed to another way in which
decentralisation affects social cohesion.
Devolution of power that empowers institutions
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that operate locally can provide a space for
groups to participate in their own development –
space that might not exist at the central level.
He affirmed that ‘community driven
development if acting as a function of local
governance, can reduce patronage and elite
capture if well designed’ (ibid.). However, the
same study warned that community-driven
development might not necessarily lead to social
cohesion if ‘projectivised’ and if it ignores
contextual dynamics. Local governance
measures proposed in the study by Marc et
al.(2013) to support social cohesion include
supporting informal justice mechanisms (local
forms of addressing conflict; for example,
through customary laws and practices); the
promotion of participation in local structures
including service delivery; and the
encouragement of civil society to create bridges
across groups. While these measures in and of
themselves may have potential to be effective in
certain contexts, what will be argued through the
Egyptian case study, is that they can also be used
to re-enforce unequal hierarchies.
Efforts to foster solidarity across advantaged and
disadvantaged groups can come at a cost:
ignoring the underlying structural roots of
inequality, and accordingly not adopting policies
that deal with them. As Dixon et al. (2002: 417)
have suggested:
Research on common identification suggests
that even when we are successful in creating
more positive intergroup attitudes,
encouraging people to evaluate one another
more favourably, we may leave unaltered the
conservative policy orientations of the
historically advantaged. Viewing others as
part of a shared in-group, it seems, does not
necessarily promote support change in a
structural or institutional sense. Moreover,
members of dominant groups lean towards
‘assimilative’ forms of inclusion that preserve
rather than challenge social inequalities.
A power analysis may expose how devolution of
power to manage local conflict may seem on the
surface as enhancing local citizen participation,
but when occurring in conjunction with other
political phenomena may perpetuate
inequalities. For example, hidden power
characterised by who sets the agenda and the
terms of engagement, what is to be kept off the
agenda, who is invited, and who is kept out,
determines the nature of relationships being
forged under the ‘social cohesion’ mantra. If both
groups have been raised to believe that it is
natural/expedient for the stronger party to
influence and shape the agenda, then through
the invisible power of these normative values,
such an assimilative form of intergroup
collaboration is presented as a step towards
social cohesion.
Visible power refers here to:
seeing who participates, who wins and who
loses in these arenas… For instance, we can
analyse which interests are able to maintain
debate, whose interests prevail in key
decisions, such as on a key policy or budget
decision, and whose voices and interests are
present, but have little influence.1
One of the limitations of focusing exclusively on
visible ways in which power is exercised is that
there is little attention being paid to those voices
that are not being represented and the reasons
behind it.
Hidden forms of power:
are used by vested interests to maintain their
power and privilege by creating barriers to
participation, by excluding key issues from the
public arena, or by controlling politics
‘backstage’. They may occur not only within
political processes, but in organizational and
other group contexts as well, such as
workplaces, NGOs or community-based
organizations.2
Invisible power goes a step further than hidden
power because it does not look at the issues that
are kept off the agenda, but the ways in which
ideologies, values and forms of behaviour
influence how people think and relate to issues.
In this form of power, people may be unaware
of their rights, their ability to speak out, and
may come to see various forms of power or
domination over them as ‘natural’, or at least
unchangeable, and therefore unquestioned.
Poor people, for instance, may accept their
circumstance as the status quo even in the face
of inequalities around them, internalizing
dominant explanations of poverty.3
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These three concepts inform the power lens used
to examine decentralisation and social cohesion
in the context of Egypt’s transition in the next
section.
3 The Egyptian context
Mubarak, who ruled Egypt for almost 30 years,
was ousted on 11 February 2011, against the
backdrop of mass citizen uprisings and some
army commanders’ allying with the people in a
quiet coup against the president (Tadros 2012a).
The 18 days of uprising witnessed a historical
moment of citizens unifying under a common cry:
‘Bread, Freedom, Social Justice’ (a variation of
which was ‘Bread, Freedom and Human Dignity).
In Tahrir Square, in particular, what emerged was
a space with its own normative social values that
was distinct from the rest of the country. Images
of men holding the Koran and the cross were
widely disseminated in the media, intended to
enforce the notion that there is religious unity in
the face of a common oppressor.
Yet the spirit of Tahrir Square did not have a ripple
effect spatially or temporally on Muslim–Christian
relations after the common mission of ousting
Mubarak had been accomplished.
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF) which assumed power after the ousting
of Mubarak in 2011 forged an informal alliance
with the Muslim Brotherhood (Tadros 2012b).
The incidents of sectarian violence against
Christian minorities, Baha’is and Sufis increased
in 2011.4 This rise in sectarian violence has its
historical roots in a complex set of factors
including state policies that were discriminatory
against Christian minorities; the Islamisation
from below by the Muslim Brotherhood, the
Salafis and a plethora of Islamist movements;
rising intolerance towards religious minorities and
bad governance more broadly. However, the state
security investigations (SSI) apparatus used
tactics of both repression and appeasement to
control the sectarian situation on the ground. In
the aftermath of the January 25th revolution, the
SSI apparatus [mabah amn al dawla] temporarily
took back stage and no longer governed sectarian
relations – at least not visibly. As draconian
measures on the regulation of political space were
lifted, civil and uncivil forms and expressions of
political agency were unleashed. Sectarian
animosity towards Christians which had been
simmering under the surface – but was muted by
the security apparatus – came to the surface after
25 January. The complete breakdown of a
functioning security system (in the sense of
protecting citizens from individual and organised
forms of violence and crime) and absence of rule
of law affected all Egyptian citizens, but made
Coptic citizens particularly vulnerable to violence.
However, the rise in sectarianism was not only a
consequence of cumulative build-up of sectarian
violence of previous years and security breakdown
in the aftermath of a revolution, it was also a
direct consequence of the policies pursued by the
army (SCAF) when it ruled the country between
February 2011 to June 2012 and further amplified
after President Morsi took over. The military
police were responsible for the single worst
incident of sectarian violence against Christians
in contemporary Egyptian history. On 9 October
2011, thousands of protesters had staged a
peaceful march to the national state broadcasting
station known as the Maspiro building in
downtown Cairo to condemn the burning of a
church by extremists in the governorate of
Aswan. They were then attacked by security
forces and the army’s military police, the latter
using army vehicles that looked like tanks to
repeatedly run over fleeing protesters. The
assault which became known as the Maspiro
massacre, was captured on live TV and broadcast
worldwide, led to 28 deaths and an estimated
200–300 injuries. Hamdeen Badin, the Chief of
the Army Police who gave the orders for the army
police to attack the protesters was a member of
SCAF and to date has not been prosecuted.
Against the backdrop of a hostile political stance
on the part of SCAF towards religious minorities,
the new power configuration in Egypt had
bestowed on the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Islamists more generally substantial formal and
informal power to influence all levels of
governance. This had a direct relationship on
sectarianism relations, a theme I return to later.
Table 1 comprises incidents recorded in the press
between 2008 and 2012 compiled and verified by
author.
4 Triggers of sectarian conflict
In order to trace the changing pattern of
sectarian assaults over time and to show how
levels of violence featured before and after the
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January 2011 revolution, an analysis of incidents
was captured from 2008 to 2012. (It was not
possible to acquire the data for the years prior to
2008 and data for 2013 is still being synthesised).
An analysis of the data for 2008–12 shows that
not only have the number of sectarian incidents
increased since 2011 in quantitative terms, but
qualitatively, the level of intensity of assault has
also increased. It is possible to note the following
number of indicators of increasing violence
against Christian minorities, the first being the
transformation of small-scale disputes that are
not of a religious nature into collective assaults
on minority groups if one party in the dispute
happens to be Christian. A most common trigger
is rumours spread about a Christian acting in a
way that is offensive to his/her fellow Muslims,
such as allegedly slandering religion or about an
individual verbally or physically attacking a
Muslim (i.e. that s/he allegedly slandered Islam).
A dispute between children in a street football
match, where one party happens to be a
Christian can lead to the mass mobilisation of
Muslims in the neighbourhood (and sometimes
adjoining ones) to collectively avenge for the
Muslim who has been wronged by the Christian.
Such avenge does not happen against the
Christian in question, but his family and
Christians in the surrounding area, even if they
were completely unrelated to the incident.
The second trigger (and cause) of sectarian
violence is associated with the construction and
renovation of Christian places of worship.
Following the revolution, a new phenomenon
emerged which makes it difficult to classify as
‘church expansion/construction related’. These
were acts which did not involve either the
construction or renovation of churches, nor were
brought about by any visible triggers. Such acts
included the Salafi occupation and attempted
annexation of church-owned buildings, the
mobilisation of citizenry to press that a church
be closed on the premise that it is unlicensed, or
acts of sudden destruction of church fences and
annexation of parts of the premises (all of which
occurred in Minya, Cairo, Beni Suef, Sohag, for
example). This shows a rather serious new
development, in incidents of ‘untriggered’
assault on Coptic Christians. It suggests that
there has been a rise in the level of intolerance,
such that the very existence of churches in an
area is cause for sectarian assault.
The third main trigger of sectarian assault was
matters to do with Muslim–Christian gender
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Table 1 Incidents recorded in the press (2008–12)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total %
Escalation of small disputes/fights 11 14 1 11 24 61 20.89
Building/expansion of churches or related to its 
registration/licence 1 8 10 15 12 46 15.75
Muslim/Christian gender relations and 
disappearance of women and girls* 4 7 9 13 13 46 15.75
Reasons related to Coptic converts to Islam 3 0 13 6 7 29 9.93
Property disputes 7 2 3 3 5 20 6.85
Attacks on Christian protesters 0 0 1 4 0 5 1.71
News/rumours of defamation of Islam 2 0 1 1 7 11 3.77
Alleged Christian evangelical activities 1 0 2 0 0 3 1.03
Other reasons 4 1 2 1 4 12 4.11
Untriggered – no reason 0 0 3 16 40 59 20.21
Total number of incidents 33 32 45 70 112 292 100.00
Note *Italics were not applied to the original analysis for 2008–10 but were added thereafter as a consequence of
the widening scope of the nature of the trigger.
Source Author’s own (analysed further in Tadros 2013). 
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relations which are considered anathema for the
majority if they involve a Christian man being in
a relationship with a Muslim woman and
anathema for a minority if they involve a Muslim
man in relationship with a Christian woman.
What causes sectarian strife is often when
Christian women disappear and their families
discover that they have converted and married a
Muslim man, but they have no way of finding out
whether they did so voluntarily or under
pressure. Matters become particularly
aggravated when the missing daughters are
minors (below 16 years of age), in which case
legally they are under the guardianship of their
families and the state is obliged to help them
find their daughters, which it is reluctant to do.
However, after the revolution, once again, a new
phenomenon emerged, making it difficult to
classify under ‘gender relations’ and that is the
disappearance of young girls and women (at least
eight incidents in 2012) where there is no
evidence that a relationship with a Muslim man
existed previously. These were incidents in which
women were out on errands or returning from a
social engagement and never returned. In one
instance, a Salafi leader admitted that the young
woman, aged 14, was in their company, that she
intended to convert and that the family should
not try to get in touch with her. These incidents
have led to the organisation of protests and
marches by Coptic citizenry, sometimes entering
into direct confrontations with the powers that be.
The most dramatic change in sectarian violence
to have occurred after the Islamists informally
rose to power in 2011 and formally assumed
office in 2012 has been the rise of ‘untriggered’
incidents of assault against Christians. There
were three such incidents in 2010, 16 in 2011 and
31 in 2012. For example, there were several
incidents in which Coptic Christian women were
assaulted for not wearing a veil. While non-veiled
Muslim women were also exposed to such acts, in
the case of the former, they would be
accompanied by verbal abuse such as being
referred to as ‘infidels’.
What is clear is that the overwhelming majority
of sectarian incidents of violence occur at the
community level, rather than high-level
confrontations between religious leaders or state
figures at a national level. There was a political
vacuum created once the SSI apparatus
retreated from governing at local level, leading
to the emergence of alternative actors who
assumed a community policing role. This was not
a state policy of decentralisation through
legislation delegating responsibility to local
authorities or formal institutions. It was a
combination of rulers delegating local leaders
with the responsibility of mediating sectarian
relations but also a by-product of the collapse of
the tight rein of the former regime on local
spaces which became captured by new political
actors. This new configuration of power was to
have a central impact on the mediation of
relations between Muslims and Christians at a
local community level.
5 Informal devolution in Egypt: ruptures in
social cohesion
The Muslim Brotherhood-led government that
ruled between July 2012 and June 2013 did not
take any formal measures of decentralisation
such as delegating central government budgets
and responsibilities to local municipalities and
councils. The government has also not formally
sought to devolve the power of central
government to issue legislation at a local level.
Nor have service delivery measures been
implemented in a way to increase local ownership
and management. However, there have been a
number of informal mechanisms of decentralising
authority to the benefit of local actors. There
have also been incidents where the government
had to yield to local demands associated with
governance issues. In the following section we will
examine instances of decentralisation through
the pursuit of informal justice mechanisms in a
context where security is lax (no policemen to
protect civilians from violence) and there is no
rule of law. The focus here on informal justice is
also informed by local contextual dynamics:
namely, how conflict is mediated wields
important political signals to the broader
community on the status quo’s tolerance for
violence against minorities and where the power
lies in framing and determining what justice is.
6 Devolution through the enforcement of
informal justice mechanisms
One of the most dramatic changes occurring
after the revolution is in the shift in the
management of sectarian incidents on a local
level from the SSI apparatus to that of the
Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis. The
outcome of such informal committees for
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administering justice has been the creation of
deep fissures between Muslims and Christians in
a way that severely undermines social cohesion.
A troubling phenomenon had started to appear
from 2000 onwards (Shoukry 2009) which is that
of informal reconciliation sessions as mechanisms
of administering justice. These were in lieu of
recourse to justice. In the Urfi (customary) justice
system, the head of the tribe or elder reputed for
being just and wise arbitrates after hearing the
accounts of both parties. In view of their social
legitimacy, decisions arrived at during these
customary sessions are considered binding. Since
the process is governed by the principles of
Islamic Sharia, there are specific conditions to be
met in the selection of the judge, the presence of
witnesses, the presence of the defence, the
people, the process of issuing a decree, and so
forth. However, Shoukry (2009) noted that what
occurred was the distortion of how Urfi courts
were historically administered.
There was one major significant difference
perhaps between the Urfi courts as they were
administered in tribes and Bedouin communities
and as they have been administered in cases of
sectarian violence: namely, the arbitrator
became the SSI apparatus which was able to
exercise soft power (persuasion and ‘firm
requests’) and hard power (incarceration and
threats of torture) should citizens not comply. Its
powers had in many instances in Mubarak’s
Egypt surpassed those of the National Prosecutor
and hence, it was empowered to usurp the course
of justice through the administration of the rule
of law. Ironically, it was a case in which the
arbitrator of justice was an accomplice in the
very act of violence that was instigated in the
first place. In the majority of cases of SSI-
administered incidents of reconciliation sessions
(lejan al solh), there was a clear attempt at
mollifying the dominant group in the community
at the expense of the weaker party. The rulings
often meant a collective penalisation of all the
Christian inhabitants of a particular village as a
consequence of the act of one individual or
family, and it often meant that compensation for
assaults made on Christian places of worship or
property were, if at all, only of a nominal value.
As the political restrictions against civil activism
waned after the revolution, the inhibitions
against Islamist forces were removed, and they
assumed a more prominent leadership role in
public in particular on a local level. Yet replacing
state security officials with local influential
authoritative leaders who have large followings
did not create the conditions for more social
cohesion, but rather social alienation. What will
be shown next is that the delegation of
resolution of conflict to the Salafis with the
implicit endorsement of the Muslim
Brotherhood-led government did not deliver on
justice any more than the SSI-mediated
reconciliation sessions enacted during Mubarak’s
era. On the contrary, the outcome of these
informal sessions was even greater injustice.
Reconciliation committees, as they have been
run, institutionalise the collective subjugation of
a religious minority to the majority with severe
implications: first, they re-enforce the power of
the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood as the
authoritative mediators of conflict; second, they
signal the non-accountability of the mediators to
a higher authority; third, they send political
signals to communities that those who mobilise
the citizenry to instigate violence against the
minority will not be prosecuted; fourth, they
generate long-standing animosity in the
community that may in the long run be fertile
ground for further violence.
The problem does not lie in the principle itself of
bringing together the leaders who have authority
and legitimacy in the community to mediate in
conflict resolution, rather it is in the way in
which it increases the power of leaders whose
agenda and ideology is exclusionary towards the
weaker party. In effect it may appease the crowds
at that moment but it contributes to a disabling
environment for nurturing social cohesion on a
long-term basis.
In one of the first sectarian incidents under the
reign of the SCAF, a church was burnt in the
village of Sol in close vicinity to Greater Cairo
and reconciliation sessions were held to deal with
the crisis. A Christian man was caught alone in
the company of a Muslim woman in his car,
which stirred popular outrage and demands for
the reclaiming of honour. Concurrently, rumours
of a long-standing relationship between another
Christian man and a Muslim woman suddenly
surfaced. The elders of the most prominent
families in the village met with the local priests
and asked that the two Christian men in
question be expelled from the community. The
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priests agreed, and believed this was a
reasonable settlement that would hopefully
secure peace and harmony in the village. This
was the first of an informal, closed meeting to
administer justice, which would have worked if
the matter had stayed at the level of the
individual families in question. However, matters
associated with gender and honour are often
difficult to contain, as extended family and tribes
become involved. The uncle of the woman who
was rumoured to be in a relationship with a
Christian man confronted her father and pressed
him to kill his daughter to cleanse the family
honour. A dispute ensued between them, the
father refused to kill his daughter and defended
her virtue, the uncle insisted that the family
honour had been tarnished, matters escalated,
and both shot each other to death.
On 4 March 2012, the day of their burial, after
Friday prayers, unknown persons incited citizens
to seek vengeance against the Christians who
were blamed for the loss of the lives of the two
Muslim men. The uncle was a member of the
Islamist movement (the author is unclear whether
this was the Salafis or the Muslim Brotherhood).
Inhabitants of Atfeeh responded by burning the
church and looting and pillaging the property of
many Christian residents of the area. In the first
reconciliation session that was held soon after
with SCAF’s presence and with the participation
of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi leaders,
and representatives from the church, the church
leaders were pressed to agree to rebuild the
church in a different location, preferably on the
edge of town, to avoid disturbing majority
sensibilities. It was also agreed that the
perpetrators (who were caught on camera) would
not be tried.5 This was the first administration of
informal justice in which the Islamists were
brought in to mediate. The terms of the
agreement were in some ways similar to those of
the security apparatus, and in some ways much
worse. In such cases the SSI would have pressed
on a settlement that does not include referring
the perpetrators to trial. While there have not
been instances in which a church was attacked
during Mubarak’s reign, there are no records of
the SSI ruling in the informal sessions that it be
relocated outside the village. In other words, the
level of injustice imposed was even higher.
Following massive protests led by youth
coalitions and Copts at Maspero, the army
volunteered to rebuild the church, although the
perpetrators were never referred to trial. When
the army came under open fire for having
summoned the renowned Salafi Sheikh
Mohammed Hassan (commonly known as Sheikh
Hassan) to manage the reconciliation
committee, SCAF sought to deflect criticism of
their continued reliance upon him for managing
sectarian strife by explaining that it is ‘because
people listen to him.’6 The army built a new
church in a speedy and efficient manner, and
they also built a new mosque, of great grandeur
and of greater proportions to the church in the
same village, in addition to building a new
bakery and upgrading the existing health centre.
The Coptic families that left following the crisis
returned but one of the Coptic residents who was
interviewed a year later, reported that though
there have been no outbreaks of violence, the
situation has remained tense. One man said ‘now
if there is a wedding or a funeral, we don’t go to
pay our tribute and likewise they don’t come to
ours [weddings and funerals] except those who
are very close friends’. The same man was keen
to point out that some Muslims played an
exceptionally heroic role in trying to protect the
church and the homes of the Copts from being
looted and plundered; however, things were not
like they were before. ‘It’s like each keeps to his
own’ said another interviewee. What the above
suggests is that while informal reconciliation
sessions mediated by popular local leaders may
end the crisis, the non-enforcement of justice
creates a deep rupture in social relations which
lingers on, well after the incident itself.
Members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Salafis also organised a series of widely
publicised reconciliation committees in the
village of Al Nahdah in the town of Ameriyya,
Alexandria in January/February 2012. In January
2012, rumours spread that a Christian man had
allegedly circulated indecent images of a Muslim
woman via his mobile. Out of fear for his life and
the lives of his family, the young man in question
gave himself up in the local police station but the
village youth congregated and demanded that his
family be expelled as well. This was followed by
acts of burning and vandalism of homes and
property owned by Copts. In one instance, a
member of one of these families fearing for his
life against the crowds shot bullets in the air.
Three reconciliation committee meetings led by
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the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood were
convened to deal with the matter. The
reconciliation committees were attended by
Lieutenant (Ameed) Khaled Shalaby, a security
personnel, but led by the Salafi sheikhs, headed
by Sheikh El Sherif el Hawary. In the first
reconciliation committee meeting, despite the
expressed opposition of the local priest and the
Coptic family in question to the clauses of the
agreement, it was decided that three families
would be expelled, and that a committee would
be formed to sell their property. However, the
youth congregated felt that this was insufficient
punishment. In reaction, a second reconciliation
committee meeting was convened and it was
agreed that five more Coptic families would be
added to the list of those to be expelled (Gad
2012). 
In the third conclusive reconciliation committee
meeting, eight other Christian families who had
nothing to do with the young man were forcibly
expelled from the village. The agreement clauses
published in Al-Wafd newspaper stipulated that
on 1 February 2012 the ‘exit’ of the families was
for the protection of their lives. One of the more
interesting clauses was bestowing upon the
committee the responsibility of selling the
properties belonging to the expelled families,
with the pricing and the process of selling and
buying to happen under the direction of Sheikh
El Sherif el Hawary. What is striking is the way
in which the right to dispense with the property
of the Christian families, one of whom was
known to be one of the wealthier members of the
village, was violated. The Salafi and Muslim
Brotherhood leaders in the reconciliation
committee usurped the right of the police to
investigate and prosecute, and yet this contract
was signed in the presence of the highest
security authorities in Alexandria.
The second interesting clause was to bestow
upon the arbitrators the responsibility of
determining the scope of damage ‘in accordance
with the precepts of the Sharia’ (Oreiby 2012).
The reference to the Sharia law is interesting
because reconciliation committees have
conventionally followed a number of social
customs and traditions, which have
geographically differed from one area to the
next. The urf, or custom, in this area was that a
man would not be expelled except if there was a
case of premeditated murder, and even then, he
himself would depart, but not his family. As for
the punishment for shooting bullets in the air
with the intention of scaring people off, custom
has it that the person would apologise and
compensate any victims injured. The collective
punishment of the Copts and their expulsion was
contrary to local custom (Gad 2012).
Once again, the press and media leaked the
details of the agreement, forcing parliament to
intervene, which sent a committee to investigate
the matter and press for the families that were
evicted to return. However, the powers of Sheikh
Hawary, the Salafi leader remained unshaken
and those responsible for the violence were not
prosecuted. The signals given implicitly were
that citizens can get away with acts of violence
against a religious minority, and this seemed to
have a ripple effect in the adjoining villages. In
May 2012, four months after the incident at Al
Nahdah village, in the nearby village of al
Bassra, rumours of an alleged relationship
between a Christian man and a Muslim woman
developed into a full-scale sectarian incident. In
early May 2012, a 20-year-old Coptic Christian
who had a small business in selling mobile
phones and mobile recharging cards passed by
one of his Muslim female neighbours who asked
him for a loan of LE20 (less than £2). He gave
her the money, but he was seen by a man who
was allegedly a member of the Salafi movement.
According to the boy’s father, this man was
responsible for spreading rumours that the
Christian man and Muslim woman were in a
relationship. He called upon the Muslim
residents to congregate at the mosque after
evening prayer, after which they attacked the
homes and businesses of the Christians living in
the village, and one residential home was burnt.
Residents of nearby villages later arrived to join
in the attacks on the other homes. As in the
village of Al Nahdah, Sheikh Sherif el Hawary
again presided over a reconciliation session in
which it was decided that the young man in
question and his family would leave the village
for a month. In the reconciliation session, it was
also revealed that the rumours regarding the
relationship were unfounded. One of the
interviewees also affirmed that the young woman
had to undergo a medical examination which
confirmed her virginity, and thus served as
evidence that they were not in a relationship.
The man who allegedly belonged to the Salafi
movement was never prosecuted for spreading
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rumours, nor were the owners of the houses
attacked compensated. Needless to say, the
young woman was also not compensated for the
loss of reputation and for her exposure to a very
humiliating medical examination. Four
Christian families voluntarily left the village,
fearing for further reprisals.
Interviews were conducted with Christian
families living in the village of Al Bassra in
March 2013, ten months after the incident. It
was clear from the interviews that social
relations were strained. The young man’s father
said ‘relations with our Muslim neighbours are
not like before anymore, the relationship now is
short, there are no dealings like before. Before
there were relations and [a feeling of] love, but
after this, it is reduced to hellos and good byes’.
The same sentiment was reiterated by other
interviewees. This further confirms that informal
reconciliation sessions undermine social
cohesion, creating the conditions for non-
engagement and mistrust. Worse, the political
signals given to the broader community can only
encourage further violence. First, that those who
perpetrate violence against Copts have no reason
to fear penalisation because the former are
second class citizens. Second, the authority of
local Islamist leaders supersedes the powers of
the state to administer justice.
7 Conclusions and key policy messages
Decentralisation tends to involve a wide range of
political, administrative and fiscal policies which
can have vastly different designs and approaches.
It can be formally pursued by the government or
implemented through an informal delegation of
powers to local actors. In this article, we have
examined two dimensions of the process of
devolving political power in Egypt; first, an
instance in which local actors sought to assume
the powers of choosing their own leader at a local
level, and second, the mediation of Islamist
forces of reconciliation sessions in lieu of the
formerly centrally managed SSI apparatus. Both
instances involved an informal process of local
actors assuming decision-making powers.
These acts of devolution of power were examined
against the backdrop of a highly volatile political
context in the aftermath of a revolt that brought
an end to Mubarak’s 30-year reign and paved the
way for the political ascendency to power of the
Muslim Brotherhood up until they were ousted
from power a year later. It argued that while the
revolution did not cause an increase in sectarian
tensions between the country’s majority and
minority religious groups, nevertheless the
power configurations that emerged thereafter
undermined social cohesion. Hence when local
actors assumed power to deal with sectarian
matters, the measures and policies reflected
unequal relations, rather than redressed them.
Measures which have been popular in
decentralisation literature such as local selection
of leadership and mediation of conflict through
informal justice mechanisms became in such
contexts, mechanisms that severely undermined
social cohesion.
In the informal reconciliation committee
meetings, if one were to define social cohesion in
terms of convergence (Marc et al. 2013) or
participation with others (Chan et al. 2006), then
communal relations may not seem so threatened.
However, if one were to consider social cohesion
in terms of Norton and De Haan (2012), one
would note that (1) there is a disempowerment
of minorities, in particular if hidden and invisible
forms of power are analysed; (2) cycles of
violence are only momentarily disrupted; and
(3) the institutions that need strengthening for
peaceful management of rapid change such as
those associated with rule of law have been
weakened at the expense of those institutions
that re-enforce power hierarchies on the ground.
Since sectarianism is very deep-seated in
Egyptian society, a strong political will at the
highest level is the critical factor that would
make the most difference here. If such a political
will exists, then a number of measures may serve
to enhance social cohesion at a local level such as:
1 Develop locally appropriate mechanisms of
reporting, documenting and flagging incidents
of sectarian conflict. One of the limitations of
having to rely on data from the press is that it
is often inadequate in exposing underlying
power dynamics at work. Also, incidents only
come to the surface if they develop into
newsworthy items – involving having already
evolved into large-scale conflict. It may be
worthwhile to examine whether it is possible
to institutionalise at a local level mechanisms
of reporting on growing tensions that would
alert us to where there are threats of possible
ruptures emerging in the community.
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2 Protect the independence of the media. In
order for a system that flags emerging
flashpoints to be effective in eliciting
appropriate responses as highlighted
previously, the independence of the press and
media are essential. The press and media
played a central role in exposing the injustices
of the outcomes of the reconciliation sessions
in all of the incidents mentioned and
described previously. While local minorities
are sometimes scared that the media’s
exposure of incidents would aggravate further
reprisals against them due to the invisible
powers at work, nevertheless, there is no
guarantee that if silence is maintained, the
situation would not have worsened anyway.
3 Reform the state security apparatus. The
retreat of heavy-handed centralised state actors
such as the SSI apparatus from managing
sectarianism has evidently not brought about
social cohesion. What is needed is a different
security role, not less security. Local police and
other security actors need to manage sectarian
conflict differently, and this requires training
but also greater accountability.
4 Strengthen rule of law. It is clear that in many
of the incidents of sectarian conflict
highlighted above, the recourse to formal
channels of justice were obstructed. However,
the politicisation of the judiciary in dealing
with sectarian matters would only serve to
undermine prospects of delivering justice. It is
critical that even if judicial court rulings are
sometimes anathema to the majority, that
they are respected and complied with, in order
to send the right signals with regard to
sectarian assault.
5 Scrutinise the outcomes of the reconciliation
committee meetings as needed. The
elimination of reconciliation committee
meetings altogether is unlikely to be the
solution to fostering social cohesion because
locally, it is the informal leaders who wield
power, not those working in the local council
or in the civil service. In other words, the
power configurations are such that those
recognised as the elders in the community in
addition to religious leaders (both Muslim and
Christian) are the ones that have the social
legitimacy to make socially binding decisions
that people adhere to. However, the
reconciliation committees have become
mechanisms for the collective punishment of
the minorities and for allowing those
responsible for inciting violence through the
spread of rumours or through inflammatory
speeches to evade accountability. The problem
is not one of visible power, that is, adequate
representation of all parties concerned, but of
hidden and invisible power (the influence of
religious leaders in citizens’ responses to
sectarianism, as well as the role of behind-the-
scenes actors). How to make reconciliation
sessions more just will require high-level
government policy as well as a strengthened
judiciary and improved security.
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Notes
1 Powercube, Understanding Power for Social
Change, www.powercube.net/analyse-power
(accessed 13 June 2014).
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 The percentage of different religious groups in
Egypt has been hotly contested (Tadros 2013);
it is generally regarded as roughly 85–90 per
cent Sunni Muslim, about 10 per cent
Christian Coptic Orthodox, less than 1 per
cent other Christian denominations, mainly
Protestant and Catholic, and less than 200,000
Baha’is. Jews account for about 200 members. 
5 Al-Wafd, 7 March 2011.
6 Al-Dustour, 11 May 2011.
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